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February 2008
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Movers and Shakers Pre-season Texas Stadium dallasnews.com
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A lot of people would look at the final score of this year’s Super Bowl – Giants 17, Patriots 14 – and think it may have been an uneven, sloppy game. Nothing could be further from the truth. It was well-played, highly competitive and one with a thrilling ending. Here’s what we culled from the tape (and if you don’t want to read it, feel free to scroll down): There are many layers to the affect the Giants defensive line had on Sunday’s game. But start with perhaps the most impactful component – The ability to handle Kevin Faulk. All year, and really in the past, Faulk has been invaluable as a checkdown option, and a way to deal with a strong pass-rush or press coverage on the perimeter. The Giants’ pass rush, first and foremost, forced the Patriots to keep Faulk into block quite a bit. And from there, they covered him well (even if he had seven catches). One way of doing it was sending a linebacker up the middle. Faulk would pick the blitz, and then the ’backer (often Antonio Pierce) wouldn’t let him peel off to where Tom Brady could get him the ball. When the Giants did let Faulk release, there was often a defensive back, and not a linebacker, waiting for him. The result? By taking away an option underneath through coverage, the rush got an extra split-second to get there. The bottom line is that the Giants wouldn’t let Faulk kill them, the way he did the Jaguars and Chargers, and that was debilitating for the struggling pass protection. The entry "Super Bowl XLII Tale of the Tape" has no entry tags. Where Eli Manning's 34 throws went on Sunday (With the Hail Mary at the end of the first half counted out) ... WR PLAXICO BURRESS WR STEVE SMITH Where Tom Brady's 48 throws went on Sunday ... WR WES WELKER WR RANDY MOSS Here’s how the Patriots attacked Eli Manning on his 38 pass drops: 3-man pressure: 1 of 38 snaps (1 first half/0 second half) Here’s how the Giants attacked Tom Brady on his 53 pass drops: 3-man pressure: 3 of 53 snaps (0 first half/3 second half) How the Giants deployed their offensive personnel on their 62 offensive snaps (not counting the game-ending kneeldown): 1 RB/0 TE/4 WR (‘10’ personnel): 22 of 62 snaps (10 first half/12 second half) We're gonna get going here with the breakdown of Super Bowl XLII. This being America, you should feel free to scroll past this for Cowboys-centric blogging. Here's how the Patriots deployed offensive personnel on their 69 offensive snaps: 1 RB/1 TE/3 WR (‘11’ personnel): 34 of 69 snaps (13 first half/21 second half) The entry "Patriots Personnel Breakdown" has no entry tags. Somehow, people got the idea that I'd be skipping out on breaking down Super Bowl XLII. Well, forget that. I'll have it for you -- All of it (Tale of the Tape, personnel breakdowns, etc. etc.) So keep an eye out for it. Expect the postmortem from one of the great upsets in NFL history either tomorrow or Thursday. Reviewing the NFC Championship Game ... As much credit as Eli Manning gets, I don’t know that there was a better player on the field Sunday than Giants middle linebacker Antonio Pierce. He looked like Ray Lewis in his prime out there. Watch the final two plays of the first quarter, two Ryan Grant run, and you’ll see what I mean. On the first one, which looked like a split-zone run, Pierce engages center Scott Wells, coming off a double team on Justin Tuck, and sheds him quickly before closing on Grant from the side. On the second one, he rides Wells right down the line and into Grant. Then, in the second quarter, on a screen play, Pierce quickly recognizes what’s happening and controls Jason Spitz to the point where he just about shoved him into Brandon Jackson. Pierce was all over the field Sunday, playing a smart, fast game. There was no one who had a bigger impact on the lights turning out on the Packer run game than him. The entry "Tale of the Tape: Giants-Packers" has no entry tags. Here's what the DVR showed on the AFC Championship Game ... I’ll give the Chargers a lot of credit for playing up and jamming the Patriots receivers at the line – something I’m pretty sure Giants DC Steve Spagnuolo’s studying intently. The New England wideouts, good as they are, haven’t been challenged a whole lot that way, and the only one that was particularly adept at beating the Charger press on Sunday was Wes Welker. So why didn’t work all the way through? Kevin Faulk, that’s why. In these situations, the Patriots could swing their jack-of-all-trades out, and put him in a position to make plays on the perimeter, either with the corners’ backs to the ball covering or with receivers in close proximity to those guys, making them imminently easier to block. The perfect example was the 11-yard back-breaker by Faulk in the fourth quarter. The Patriots swung him out of the backfield, and since the DBs were playing up, receiver Jabar Gaffney could screen both his man and Eric Weddle, assigned to Faulk, off. And Faulk came wide open down the sideline. Strange as it may sound, since he’s normally in the backfield, Faulk is one of the biggest answers the Patriots have to this type of coverage. The entry "Tale of the Tape: Chargers-Patriots" has no entry tags. Where Eli Manning's 39 throws, excluding the fourth-quarter spike, went on Sunday ... WR PLAXICO BURRESS WR AMANI TOOMER Where Brett Favre's 35 throws went on Sunday ... WR DONALD DRIVER WR KOREN ROBINSON How the Packers came after Eli Manning on his 42 pass drops (excluding a fourth-quarter spike) ... 3-man pressure: 1 of 42 snaps (1 1st half/0 2nd half/0 OT) How the Giants came after Brett Favre on his 35 pass drops ... 3-man pressure: 1 of 35 snaps (0 1st half/1 2nd half/0 OT) Where Tom Brady's 33 passes went Sunday ... WR WES WELKER RB KEVIN FAULK Where Philip Rivers' 37 throws went Sunday ... WR CHRIS CHAMBERS WR VINCENT JACKSON Here’s how the Chargers attacked Tom Brady on his 35 pass drops: 3-man pressure: 2 of 35 snaps (1 first half/1 second half) Here’s how the Patriots went after Philip Rivers on his 38 pass drops (Follow the jumps on these for all the numbers): 3-man pressure: 6 of 38 snaps (4 first half/2 second half) We're gonna get you the breakdown of the championship games here momentarily (if you don't like it, scroll down), and a little later tonight -- as Timmy Tabloid hinted -- we're going to look at some candidates to fill the holes on the Cowboys coaching staff. First, here's the unofficial personnel breakdown for each team, which was done live on Sunday (so the numbers could be slightly off): In the interest of accountability, I'm going to borrow an idea from old friend Mike Reiss of the Boston Globe and illustrate my analysis that substitution patterns on Sunday varied more than normal on offense, by counting snaps for each skill player. And just because it's the kind of guy I am, I'll post the defense snaps for each player too in a little while. Here's how much each of the skill players played: TE Jason Witten – 70 of 70 snaps (29 first half/36 second half) ANALYSIS: Of the five snaps T.O. missed, two came on the goal line, with no receivers on the field. Two others came on first downs, and another on a second down. Two passes to Patrick Crayton went for 11 yards, and Julius Jones had a 3-yard run in those spots. … Barber’s workload was positively enormous. He finished with 28 touches, and played on 37 other snaps. Was his decline in production in the second half (7 carries, 24 yards in third; 4 carries for 4 yards in the fourth) a result of the kind of pounding he hasn’t taken all year? Worth asking. … Normally, Curtis is primarily used in short-yardage, but he entered in place of Fasano plenty, and the reason why may be the team’s commitment to the running game. First of all, I’d like to thank everyone for the tremendous support I’ve gotten for this element of our coverage, with the year drawing to an end. Glad you like it, or at least it seems like most of you do. Now, the fact of the matter is that in this game, it really did look like the Cowboys were sluggish, both on the coaching and playing side, after having gone 22 days without playing a game of meaning. Here’s the rundown: One thing I’d have to question, and I did earlier, was what seemed like a make-it-up-as-we-go rotation of offensive skill players. When this offense was really, really humming, this is how they’d open the game, if there was a television timeout before their first possession: With 10 guys in the huddle and three (Sam Hurd, Oliver Hoyte, Anthony Fasano) on the sideline. One would go in, depending on the personnel grouping being ‘11’, ‘21’ or ‘12’. This would change only, for the most part, in goal-line and short-yardage spots. Against the Giants, the coaches seemed to make the mistake of trying re-invent the wheel, and may have had to with two injured receivers in the mix. The truth seemed to be, though, the offense was never in a comfort zone. It’s worth asking whether that had to do with all the moving parts. The Cowboys generally run a ton of different formations, but they do it with limited personnel combinations, by moving their tight ends around, not by switching players in and out of the game. Like I said earlier, this kind of substituting is fine if you’ve been doing it all year. The Cowboys haven’t. Here’s the perfect example of the faults in this: The toss to Terry Glenn that got picked to end the game? That was Glenn’s first snap of the final drive, thrown to an injured player between the hashmarks, where there’d almost certainly be contact if he got his hands on the ball. Where Tony Romo’s 32 throws went on Sunday: WR TERRELL OWENS TE JASON WITTEN Where Eli Manning’s 18 pass attempts went on Sunday: WR AMANI TOOMER WR STEVE SMITH How the Cowboys came after Eli Manning on his 22 pass drops: 4-man pressure: 11 of 22 snaps (9/2) MANNING NUMBERS WHAT IT MEANT: Well, for one thing, it means that Manning’s transformation into a quarterback who reads pressure well is continuing. In the playoffs, Manning is 15-of-16 for 130 yards and two touchdowns (140.1 rating) when facing five or more rushers, though he has taken three sacks. We’ll have much, much more on this in Tale of the Tape, but too often it seemed like the rush packages were less imaginative than they had been during the regular season, and this allowed Manning to react quickly to everything that was thrown at him, and go underneath to receivers facing soft coverage. How the Giants came after Tony Romo on his 40 pass drops: 3-man pressure: 2 of 40 snaps (2 first half/0 second half) ROMO NUMBERS WHAT IT MEANT: For one thing, the lackluster numbers against standard, four-man pressure meant that the Giants covered well in those situations. The sack was a result of coverage, and in plenty of other cases, the coverage was good enough to get the linemen into Romo’s face, with a collapsing pocket. And after Romo showed an aptitude for dealing with the Giants’ five-man pressure, Steve Spagnuolo seemed to approach a bit of all-or-nothing approach, sending either four or the house and crowding the line at times to disguise it. Here’s how the Cowboys deployed personnel on their 70 offensive snaps, excluding Tony Romo’s first half-ending kneeldown: 1 RB/1 TE/3 WR (‘11’ personnel): 24 of 70 snaps (7 first half/17 second half) WHAT IT MEANT: It meant the Cowboys’ substitution patterns varied wildly, after a regular season in which, except for short-yardage and goal-line situations, the team had 10 players, plus Anthony Fasano, Oliver Hoyte or Sam Hurd in the game. There was an absolute ton of different guys rotating in and out of the game, with Tony Curtis, Miles Austin and Terry Glenn in the mix more often. I’m all for this, if you’ve been doing it all year. But to do it in the playoffs, and perhaps upset the continuity of the offense, when you haven’t been doing it from game-to-game is questionable. Of course, the tune would be different if they’d won. The entry "Cowboys personnel breakdown" has no entry tags. We’re gonna get started here with the final breakdown of the year (and know this – it’s kinda frustrating that I have half the Packer-Seahawk game done, and nothing to do with it, so if I’m bitter … enough of that.) We’re going to break this down a little more extensively, since it is a playoff game, and do all elements for both teams. So here’s how the Giants deployed personnel on their 43 offensive snaps, excluding Eli Manning’s game-ending kneeldown: 2 RB/1 TE/2 WR (‘21’ personnel): 17 of 43 snaps (10 first half/7 second half) WHAT IT MEANT: The Giants seemed to line up in the ‘I’ more often then not in an effort to run the ball between the tackles, something they did very successfully. It allowed them to get a lead blocker in front of Brandon Jacobs and Ahmad Bradshaw. And oftentimes, fullback Madison Hedgecock was isolated on an inside linebacker, which worked to the Giants’ advantage. Also, Hedgecock proved valuable in blitz pick-up, allowing the Giants to release the backs and tight ends more often. On later downs, the four receiver sets seemed to be an effort to get more defensive backs on the field and create matchups for New York. The entry "Giants personnel breakdown" is tagged: Giants , Personnel breakdown Just to get you ready, here are some relevant links from my time in the bunker with these teams: Nov. 11: Cowboys at Giants Wild Card Playoff: Giants at Buccaneers And with that, here are five points I'm taking from the review (follow the jump for the full list): 1) Jason Witten’s production could well be determined by the Cowboys ability to match up without max-protecting. The Giants don’t need to blitz a ton, because they can create pressure with four. In these teams’ first game, the Cowboys inability to handle those guys without a little helped forced Witten to stay stationed at an in-line position for much of the game, thereby making him easier to cover. So when you’re watching the Giants rush, don’t just focus on the pressure they’re getting. Also looking how many Cowboys it takes to block them, relative to number of rushers coming. This will be key, since a young Giant secondary would certainly have some weight taken off them with one less receiver releasing. Here’s what I caught from the Giants-Buccaneers tape from Sunday: If there’s one thing that really worrisome about the Giants passing game, it seems to be the ability of the receivers to make sight adjustments and find holes in zones. Early on Sunday, the Buccaneers were dropping a safety into the box and, without a whole lot of help over the top, playing their corners 8 and 9 yards off the ball. And the Giants picked them apart for it. The Giants receivers would hook up at 4 or 5 yards, and Eli Manning would quickly get them the ball. It was absolutely prevalent in the second quarter, when Manning piloted touchdown drives of eight and seven plays. The Bucs tried to disguise at times, lining corners up close to the line, then having them bail before the snap. But none of it worked. The Giants receivers consistently adjusted on the fly. The Cowboys generally player their corners off the ball, so this is a concern, because it negates the pass rush (with the ball gone so quick) and moves the chains. This is a matter of Manning being patient and taking what the defense gave him, something he hasn’t always done. The other thing you see is how Manning relies on Amani Toomer to shuffle and sit down in holes in the zone, something that the receiver is very, very good at, and something that a zone-heavy team like Dallas should be concerned with. You're looking live into ... my Dallas living room. We'll have updates from here in the big city, and over in Fort Worth from Timmy Tabloid, throughout the NFC Wild Card Playoff in the Pacific Northwest. Might even throw in a few things from the night game in Pittsburgh too. You'll get quick-hitting analysis, wise-cracking and maybe even some Rom-essica gossip (that's if "Lucky" wants to pass along some more links to me and Timmy). And we'll carry it on through tomorrow's game in Tampa. Then, next week, I'll get in the bunker for a "Tale of the Tape" on whomever the Cowboys are slated to play of Jan. 13. Good? Let's get it started then. Call this the worst showing all year by the Cowboys, without, really, a close second. Part of it was lineup shuffling, yes. Still, not the way you want to go into the playoffs. Here we go: The poor conditions gave the Cowboys all kinds of trouble. To me, that begs the question: Why was the team inside its fieldhouse for practice, instead of on its water-logged outdoor fields, all week? It was common knowledge that the weather could be wet in Washington. And the Redskins seemed much more ready for those conditions. Corners Jacques Reeves and Anthony Henry had problems through the first half in changing directions when receivers made their breaks. Running backs Marion Barber and Julius Jones had trouble cutting. Receivers were slipping and sliding, and dropping the ball. The footing was bad, and some of this was to be expected. But by practicing outside, the Cowboys would’ve been more ready for it, and could’ve benefited from the experience going forward, in the case that some torrential downpour hits Irving during a playoff game. I just think these are the kinds of things championship teams do. A good example: Peyton Manning soaking about 60 footballs to practice with, in prep for last year’s Super Bowl. Where the Cowboys’ 31 throws went on Saturday: TE JASON WITTEN WR PATRICK CRAYTON Here’s how the Cowboys attacked Todd Collins on his 34 pass drops: 4-man pressure: 22 of 34 snaps (16 first half/6 second half) COLLINS NUMBERS WHAT IT MEANT: Not much, actually. The Cowboys were very vanilla. On most of the five-man rush packages, it was the three defensive linemen and two outside linebackers. Most of the four-man rush came in the nickel, out of the basic four-man line. We’ll have more on this later, but for now, be assured that the coaches weren’t going to show too much to a Redskin team they may have to contend with again in two weeks. One thing that must have been good for the coaches to see was pressure created despite not having much in the way of disguise helping them. Here’s what the Redskins did on the Cowboys' 29 pass drops on Sunday: 4-man pressure: 16 of 29 snaps (8 first half/8 second half) ROMO NUMBERS JOHNSON NUMBERS WHAT IT MEANT: It means the Redskins threw the sink at the Cowboys, and were actually pretty successful in doing it. Yes, they only had two sacks. But they got pressure, got rushers in passing lanes and, just as important, didn’t get beat deep as a result of all this. The Cowboys had five passes of more than 10 yards, and three of them were completed within 10 yards of the line of scrimmage. The way I saw, Gregg Williams called a very, very good game, balancing playing solid run defense and getting heat on the quarterback. Of course, there were the drops, and those play into all of this. But for the most part, solid coverage allowed Williams to thinker with his rush packages all afternoon. The Catholic church won't cause a delay this week, like it did on Christmas, with our staples this week. We're coming at you from here for the next few hours. So let's get started. Here’s how the Cowboys deployed personnel on their 45 offensive snaps on Sunday: 1 RB/1 TE/3 WR (‘11’ personnel): 15 of 45 snaps (5 first half/10 second half) WHAT IT MEANT: Primarily, a closer look at the numbers tells you that protecting Tony Romo against a Redskins defense hellbent on getting pressure was paramount. Romo was on the field for 26 snaps. On only five of them were there three receivers on the field. And despite not making one trip inside the Redskin 10 with Romo at the helm, the team was in ‘22’ almost as much as it was in ‘11’. For obvious reasons, this held back a passing game that was already playing without Terrell Owens, and didn’t get much out of its tight ends or backs, who were staying into protect more often. I don’t think you can totally discount Romo’s struggles – we’ll get more into that later – but it was clear he wasn’t playing with a full deck. Caught on the DVR, as the Cowboys move forward to the playoffs: The Matt Moore Fan Club got one more member on Saturday. That’d be me. I really liked the poise I saw from a kid playing behind a patchwork line with Steve Smith and not a whole lot else at receiver. He had some trouble reading coverage, particularly on the pick by Anthony Henry, where the corner pealed off into underneath coverage and got in front of a bad throw, and other spots where he threw to bracketed receivers. But he stood in the face of the rush, and worked the ball underneath impressively. I would preface most of this with “For a rookie.” He’s got a long way to go, but it looks like there’ll be a place for him in the league. Here’s how the Cowboys attacked Matt Moore on his 33 pass drops: 4-man pressure: 16 of 33 snaps (5 first half/11 second half) MOORE NUMBERS WHAT IT MEANT: The Cowboys felt very comfortable bringing extra rushers against the young quarterback, doing it on more than half of their defensive snaps, and doing it effectively. The team did roll out the 3-3 “Cowboy” front some, but not a whole lot. It was effective in just about every spot Dallas used it, and you almost got the idea there was a little bit held back in that way, perhaps for the playoffs. Part of the reason, certainly, was that they didn’t need to throw the playbook open. Even with fairly basic looks (very few dropping defensive lineman or rushing DBs), the Cowboys registered five sacks and, for the most part, prevented the big play, with the exception of one 57-yarder to Steve Smith, which came facing a four-man rush with nose tackle Tank Johnson dropping. Here’s how the Panthers attacked Tony Romo on his 44 pass drops: 3-man pressure: 6 of 44 snaps (5 first half/1 second half) ROMO NUMBERS WHAT IT MEANT: The Panthers were stunningly vanilla in attacking the Cowboys. While there was some three-man line nickel, with the fourth rusher disguised, and sparing five-man pressure, Carolina seemed determined not to get beat downfield by the Cowboys, which led to Tony Romo nickel-and-diming the Panthers to death. It’s always encouraging, and not at all surprising, to see Romo working a defense in this fashion. But you have to wonder why the Panthers did try to bring some juice to what has been an anemic pass rush, playing a quarterback coming off an injury and a first-time starting center. The best explanation I can come up with is that the Panthers conceded their rush, going up against the top-notch Cowboys line, and tried to beat them with coverage. We'll get started with the holiday-delayed breakdown of the Cowboys win over the Panthers. Here’s how the Cowboys deployed personnel on their 76 offensive snaps Saturday (excluding three kneeldowns at the end of the game): 1 RB/1 TE/3 WR (‘11’ personnel): 28 of 76 snaps (19 first half/9 second half) WHAT IT MEANT: Part of the reason the Cowboys were in three receivers so much was situational, with two-minute offense and the team’s 17 third downs factored in. But another was that the Cowboys seemed more comfortable, in general, protecting with five. The Panthers ranked last in the league in the sacks, and had Julius Peppers sidelined, so there was more of a chance to spread Carolina out to lighten up the box. Also, the Cowboys played more in two backs, thanks to a handful of snaps that had both Julius Jones and Marion Barber on the field. In general, the Cowboys were more varied formationally. And that also went for the time after Terrell Owens injury, where the three-receiver looks created more space for Tony Romo’s targets. So much for the Eagles being a speed bump on the way to home-field advantage. Should’ve known it, too. The only thing really surprising about the whole thing is that the Eagles didn’t cough it up the end, like they have all season. Here’s what we got: Over the course of this year, I’ve lauded Tony Romo for his ability to quickly get rid of the ball in the face of a blitz, by identifying where the rush is coming from and attacking that area. The receivers, too, have been great in finding that hole, sitting down in it, and giving the quarterback a place to go. And that’s why you have to give Jim Johnson, the Eagles DC, all the credit in the world for one thing he did with his blitzing on Sunday. It started with this: Johnson knew that against the Cowboys offensive line, he’d have to play some games to bring heat. So on several occasions, he overloaded one side or another, bringing two extra rushers on that end. He’d then drop the defensive end on the opposite side to cover any checkdown in the flat. Then, things got real interesting. In a lot of these situations, Romo would have a hot read to a receiver in the area vacated by the rush. But Johnson had that covered. He’d rotate his coverage to bring a defender down quickly into the open area, which made Romo hesitate or led to a pass defensed in plenty of spots. It was tougher to do to Jason Witten, who’s so big that he can get body position and catch the ball. But to the slot side, it was effective. And it, at times forced Romo to go deeper into his progressions on what normally is an easy read. The entry "Tale of the Tape" is tagged: Albert Breer , Cowboys vs. Eagles , tale of the tape Where Tony Romo’s 36 throws went on Sunday: WR TERRELL OWENS TE JASON WITTEN The entry "On Target" is tagged: Barber , Crayton , Fasano , Hurd , Owens , Romo , Witten Here’s how the Cowboys deployed personnel on their 54 offensive snaps Sunday (excluding a kneeldown at the end of the first half): 1 RB/2 TE/2 WR (‘12’ personnel): 21 of 54 snaps (12 first half/9 second half) WHAT IT MEANT: For the most part, it looked like the Cowboys were using their tight ends to occupy linebackers, and they moved them around to try and keep the Eagles from blitzing too much, putting both Jason Witten and Anthony Fasano on the perimeter to force the defense to account for them. When Witten and Fasano (before his third quarter injury) were in-line, it covered the front to protect against the blitz. The Cowboys went to the three-receiver sets en masse in the fourth quarter, battling the clock, and also played more with a fullback down the stretch, after Fasano suffered a concussion. And it was no accident that the Philly sacks came then. The entry "Personnel breakdown" is tagged: Eagles , offense Sorry about the delay here. It’s been a busy day. And with the way this team’s winning, I don’t think they’re getting much lighter from here on out. On to the tape: When a team that’s won a lot (see: Patriots, New England) comes close to losing to a team that hasn’t won so much, it’s popular to say that a “blueprint” is being drawn. And the Cowboys have faced that in the days following the Lions game, specifically in regards to their run defense. Don’t listen to that. The real blueprint Detroit drew was on how to throw at the Cowboys. Over the last few weeks, we’ve seen the Cowboys open the defensive playbook and tinker with personnel combinations and rush packages What the Lions’ early success running the ball seemed to do was force the Cowboys to play more out of their base 3-4 – by unofficial count on 49 of their 69 defensive snaps. And that’s even with three plays at the end of each half in prevent included. That allowed the Lions to throw against the Cowboys’ big personnel, with Bradie James and Akin Ayodele in coverage at linebacker, rather than Kevin Burnett and Roy Williams, just two corners on the field, and Williams playing one of the safeties. So why did tight end Sean McHugh have three catches for 60 yards (and could’ve had more) after catching 11 balls all year heading into this one? Why were the Lions able to work the middle and the flats? Because the Cowboys had their nickel and dime groups on the bench. You can bet that teams will see this, and throw out of bigger offensive personnel sets on earlier downs, forcing the Cowboys’ 3-4 on the field and taking advantage of its coverage shortcomings. The entry "Tale of the Tape" is tagged: cowboys tale of the tape |
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